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 ABSTRACT 
In this paper we look at the Indian financial crisis of 1990-1992 that included 
three credit rating downgrades of two notches each in the short space of 9 months. We 
measure to what extent India’s financial difficulties were the result of conditions 
prevailing on the international capital markets at the time, reflected in changes in the 
risk free international term structure of interest rates, and to what extent they were 
linked to credit risk specific to the country’s political environment and its economic and 
financial management as reflected in the three ranking migrations.1 We find that most of 
the changes in Indian Eurobond prices over the period were due to conditions on the 
international capital markets. Migration effects were surprisingly small. Interestingly, 
our results show that there are no maturity, currency or bond specific effects of 
migration on percentage changes in the bond prices. However, when we measure the 
cost of migration in terms of basis points on the yield to maturity, we find that migration 
is relatively more costly for shorter maturities.  Averaging over all bonds, the first 
migration added about 106 basis points to the bonds’ yields to maturity while the third 
migration added about 42. The second migration was very small and not statistically 
significant, indicating that it was anticipated by the markets and priced in the first 
downgrade.  
JEL Classification: 0530, 0160, G150, P330, F340  
Key Words: Credit risk, market risk, term structure of interest rates, duration, ratings 
migration.
                                                 
1 In the credit risk literature, migrations refer to changes in credit rating in the sense that a country 
“migrates” from a rating of A2, for example, to a rating of Baa3. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the period 1990-1992, the world economy was going through a rough 
patch exacerbated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War and its aftermath. 
At the same time, public reports of India’s financial problems generated rumors of an 
impending crisis and caused the rapid downgrading of Indian Eurobonds from A2 to 
Baa1 to Baa3 to Ba2 within the short space of a year.2 The situation was further 
complicated by political turmoil surrounding the general elections of 1991, the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, a prominent candidate, in May 1991 by Sri Lankan 
guerillas and a stock market scam involving government and banking officials in April-
May of 1992. As a result of all this, international credit became scarce and shorter-term 
rollover debt became more costly. Indeed, bond issues ceased completely for several 
years. However, India never defaulted or rescheduled its debt. In spite of its foreign 
exchange difficulties, it put a brake on its foreign borrowings and with the help of 
foreign exchange loans and advice from the IMF, after 44 years of socialism, proceeded 
with a structural, market oriented reform of the economy.3 By 1993 the crisis had 
passed. The question that we ask in this paper is to what extent India’s financial 
difficulties were the result of conditions prevailing on the international capital markets 
at the time as reflected in the international, risk-free term structure of interest rates and 
to what extent they were linked to credit risk specific to the country’s political 
environment and its economic and financial management as reflected in the three 
ranking migrations. 
 
 This paper makes a first contribution with respect to the literature on India’s 
economy. First of all, we show that economic and financial conditions prevailing in the 
                                                 
2 Defined by Moodys. A2 indicates a good ability to repay while Baa3 is indicative of junk bonds and Ba2 is speculative.  
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rest of the world, reflected in the international, risk-free term structure of interest rates, 
are the major determinants in changes in Indian Eurobond prices and its component cost 
of borrowing. Secondly, we show the impact of changes in India’s internal political 
environment and its economic and financial management, reflected in the three 
downgrades in less than a year - from A2 to Baa1 on October 4, 1990, from Baa1 to 
Baa3 on March 26, 1991 and from Baa3 to Ba2 on June 24, 1991 – on the country’s 
bond prices and component cost of borrowing were relatively small. 
 
This paper makes a second contribution with respect to the literature on credit 
ratings and sovereign debt. In fact, very little work has been done on pricing the impact 
of migration on sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt. One of the reasons for this is that 
few sovereigns and almost no low credit quality sovereigns have ratings histories longer 
than a decade. Therefore, estimating the transition matrices is difficult, especially in so 
far as very few government bonds have a history of sufficient in-sample rating 
migrations.4 For example, Duffie et al. (2001) have only one event in their study. In this 
paper, there are three migrations and the effect of each one is measured explicitly. 
 
The effect of credit ratings is important because credit ratings play a major role 
in determining a borrower’s cost of credit and access to the capital markets.5 They now 
constitute the basic infrastructure for many models designed to measure credit risk, such 
as CreditMetrics from JP Morgan or the KMV methodology from KMV Corporation 
                                                                                                                                               
3 See Appendix 1 for details of the reform program. 
4Hu, Kiesel and Perraudin (2001) attempt to extract information from sovereign defaults observed over a longer period and a broader set of countries to derive 
estimates of sovereign transition matrices. However this is only an estimate for a broad group of countries and hence may not be precise. 
5 Globalization of the world’s capital markets has intensified their importance. 
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(now part of Moody’s).6 Furthermore, ratings, migration and transition probabilities7 
play a prominent role in credit risk management and the pricing of credit derivatives.8 
They are also prominent in plans for the next step in the regulatory capital standard for 
banks, which currently admits internal models for market risk and now calls for the 
development of a value-at-risk (VAR) framework for credit risk. 
 
The specific relationship between credit ratings and sovereign debt is important 
because sovereign debt differs from corporate debt in several fundamental ways, which 
are likely to influence investors’ perceptions of ratings where sovereigns are concerned 
and their reaction to sovereign rating changes when they occur:  
1. There is no recognized legal framework for sorting out sovereign defaults.9 Because 
of this and the principle of sovereignty, in a sovereign default creditors have very 
little scope for seizing assets as is the case in corporate defaults.  
2.  Largely as a result of 1, the resolution of sovereign defaults has usually included 
the rescheduling of outstanding contractual maturities, i.e., the transformation of 
contractual maturities into longer-term liabilities. This introduces an element of 
uncertainty regarding the actual maturities of the contractual cash flows. 
3. The uncertainty regarding the cash flow maturities is compounded by what is known 
as the sovereign’s “willingness” to pay. The creditworthiness of a corporate 
borrower depends, for all practical purposes, on its ability to pay, whereas for a 
sovereign borrower, besides the ability to pay, creditworthiness depends on the 
                                                 
6 Other methods for credit risk measurement include expert systems and subjective analysis, and accounting based credit-scoring systems. See Altman and 
Saunders (1998) for a review of credit risk measurement techniques over the last 20 years.  
7 Transition probabilities refer to the probabilities that a country will migrate from its current rating to 
another rating over a given period of time, usually one year. 
8 See Kao (2000) for a review of the development of modeling and pricing credit risk and the statistical properties of credit spread behavior over time.  
9 There are semi-official organizations such as the Paris Club for sovereign creditors and the London 
Club for private creditors. 
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government’s willingness or unwillingness to pay even if it has the ability.10 A 
variable like this is very difficult to measure and integrate in a systematic manner 
into a rating system, which is based fundamentally on the ability to pay. Thus, 
default and transition probabilities for sovereigns are less reliable and more difficult 
to interpret than they are for corporates.  
 
The paper also makes a contribution to the literature on credit risk analysis in 
that it provides an innovative methodology for measuring the pure impact of migrations 
on bond prices and interest rate spreads. The difficulty in doing this is linked to the 
difficulty of disentangling pure credit risk from market risk. As Jarrow and Turnbull 
(2000) point out, market and credit risk are intrinsically related to each other and are not 
inseparable.11 Market risk generated by an unexpected change in the firm’s assets also 
affects the probability of default, thereby generating credit risk as well. Conversely, 
credit risk generated by an unexpected change in the probability of default also affects 
the value of the firm, thereby generating market risk. Furthermore, market participants 
often anticipate forthcoming credit events before they actually happen so that prices 
adjust to the new credit status before the rating agencies have been able to effectively 
change the ratings. Where sovereign debt is concerned these problems are complicated 
by the fact that the concept of asset values that underpin the debt do not apply, as we 
have seen above. 
 
Research looking at separating market risk and credit risk is substantial and 
growing. The main approach, based on Merton (1974, 1977), views bonds as contingent 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Clark and Zenaidi (1999). 
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claims on the borrowers’ assets. The credit event is modeled as timing risk when the 
assets of the borrower reach a threshold. In Merton (1974, 1977), Black and Cox 
(1976), Ho and Singer (1982), Chance (1990) and Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan 
(1993) default is modeled as occurring at debt maturity if the assets of the borrower are 
less than the amount of the debt due. More recent models starting with Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) have randomized the timing of the default event determined by when 
the value of the assets hits a pre-determined barrier. Other papers such as Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995), Madan and Unal (1998) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) model the 
timing of the default event as a Poisson process or a doubly stochastic Poisson process 
(Lando, 1994). 
 
The four basic approaches for estimating the impact of a rating change on the 
price of a bond are summarized in Altman (1998). The first involves multiplying the 
change in the yield spread between the initial rating and the new rating by the bond’s 
modified duration. This approach mixes market risk and credit risk and makes the 
unrealistic assumptions of no changes in the term structure of interest rates or in 
duration. A second approach applies event study methodology to directly observe the 
price changes of a large sample of bonds from different rating categories. The problem 
here is to ascertain the correct event date because by the time the rating has changed, it 
is probably too late. Furthermore, no distinction is made between changes due to market 
conditions and pure credit changes. A third approach discounts the bond’s cash flows 
using the forward zero coupon curve for bonds in the new rating class. Again, no 
distinction is made between market risk and pure credit risk and the assumption is that 
                                                                                                                                               
11Without distinguishing between market risk and credit risk, Aronovich (1999) and Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) show a strong negative relationship between 
the country credit rating and international borrowing cost. 
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differentials between yield curves in the different rating categories are due exclusively 
to credit risk. Finally, the fourth approach decomposes the observed market spreads of 
bonds in various rating classes and uses the historical rating drift patterns to estimate 
the consequences of a rating change. The problem here again is that neither the spreads 
nor the drift patterns distinguish between market risk and credit risk.  
  
Our approach distinguishes explicitly between market fluctuations and rating 
changes. It involves estimating the cost of both simultaneously. It also incorporates a 
time varying term structure of interest rates. Thus, the paper contributes to the empirical 
side of the sovereign debt literature. However, our goal is more modest than most 
studies. Rather than testing a bond pricing model such as Merrick (1999) for Argentine 
and Russian bonds or Keswani (1999) and Pagès (2000) on Latin American Brady 
bonds or Dullman and Windfuhr (2000) on European government credit spreads, we 
seek simply to measure the effect of rating migration on sovereign bond prices and 
yields. To this end, we proceed in 3 steps: 
1. We establish the relationship in the absence of migration between a risky bond and a 
theoretical bond similar in every way to the risky bond except that it is riskless. 
2. We compute the riskless term structure of interest rates and use it to calculate the 
price of the theoretical bond. 
3. We use regression analysis to estimate the relationship between the risky and 
theoretical bonds to compute the price changes in the risky bond due to changes in 
the riskless term structure (market risk) along with dummy variables timed to the 
downgrade to measure the effect of migration on the price of the risky bond. 
 
 9  
When this methodology is applied to the case of Indian Eurobonds 1990-1992, 
our results show that there are no maturity, currency or bond specific effects of 
migration on percentage changes in the bond prices. However, when we measure the 
cost of migration in terms of basis points on the yield to maturity, we find that migration 
is relatively more costly for shorter maturities.  Averaging over all bonds, the first 
migration added about 106 basis points to the bonds’ yields to maturity while the third 
migration added about 42. The second migration was very small and not statistically 
significant, indicating that it was anticipated by the markets and priced in the first 
downgrade.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the 
relationship between the risky and theoretical riskless bonds. Section 3 describes the 
data and outlines the methodology for testing. Section 4 presents the results, which 
include cubic spline estimates, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1995) T-bar test for 
stationarity in the dependent and independent variables as well as control tests of the 
migration coefficients controlling for currency effects, maturity effects and specific 
bond effects. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
2. Modeling the Relationship between the Risky and Theoretical Bonds 
 In order to measure price changes in the risky bond due to changes in the term 
structure of interest rates, we construct a theoretical bond or series of bonds identical in  
every way to the bond(s) under consideration except that the price(s) of the theoretical 
bond(s) are determined by the riskless zero coupon term structure of interest rates. In the 
absence of credit risk, changes in the price of the theoretical bond(s) will be due 
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exclusively to changes in the term structure. We then determine the relationship between 
the price of the theoretical bond and the observed bond. We define changes in the price of 
the observed bond that are due to this relationship as market risk. 
 
Consider the following notation: 
iT0  = the price of theoretical bond i at time 0. 
+= 1tr the riskless zero coupon rate for period t. 
tC  = the cash flow for period t. 
iP0  = the observed price of bond i at time 0. 
+= 1tR  the risk adjusted zero coupon rate for period t. 
in  = maturity date of bond i. 
The observed and theoretical prices of bond i are given as 
 
i
ii
n
n
i
n
iii RCRCRCP −−− +++= K2221110                     (1) 
 
i
ii
n
n
i
n
iii rCrCrCT −−− +++= K2221110                         (2) 
 
First differencing gives 
 
i
ii
ii
n
nn
n
i
ni
iii
R
dR
RCn
R
dRRC
R
dRRCdP −−− −−−−= K
2
22
22
1
11
11 21          (3) 
 
i
ii
ii
n
nn
n
i
ni
iii
r
dr
rCn
r
drrC
r
drrCdT −−− −−−−= K
2
22
22
1
11
11 21                (4) 
 11  
 
 To simplify the demonstration but with very little loss of generality we assume 
that changes in the term structures are linked to the short term riskless rate by functions 
of time such that 
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 Divide equation 3 by iP0  and equation 4 by 
iT0  and substitute equations 5 and 6  
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 Equation 7 gives the elasticity of the observed bond with respect to the short-
term riskless interest rate while equation 8 gives a measure of the duration of the 
theoretical bond, which is also its elasticity with respect to the short term riskless rate. 
Denote the right hand side (RHS) of equation 7 as iE  and the RHS of equation 8 as iD , 
isolate 11 rdr , equate the two and rearrange. This gives 
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 Equation 9 measures percentage changes in the observed bond’s market value as 
proportional to percentage changes in the theoretical bond. The proportion is equal to 
the ratio of the elasticities of the observed and theoretical bonds with respect to the 
short-term riskless interest rate, which is, by definition, exclusive of credit risk. Since 
pure term structure changes reflect changes in the equilibrium conditions on the capital 
markets, equation 9 captures the market risk for bond i. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Estimating the Riskless Term Structure of Interest Rates 
 In order to estimate the market risk, we need to estimate the riskless zero coupon 
term structure of interest rates. Although several models such as Carleton and Cooper 
(1976), Schaefer (1981), Vasichek and Fong (1982), Chambers, Carleton and Waldman 
(1984), Mastronikola (1991) exist to estimate the term structure, Shea (1985) compares 
them and finds McCulloch’s cubic spline model empirically tractable, easily computable by 
OLS and parsimonious.12 Furthermore, Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984), Luther and Matatko 
(1992), Deacon and Derry (1994 a and b) and Bradley (1991) have successfully applied 
this model in their empirical studies. In this study we use the McCulloch cubic spline.13 
 
                                                 
12 The advantage of this is the presence of a global optimum instead of a multitude of local optima generated by a highly non-linear model such as Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross (1985).   
13 We also estimate the Cox, Ingersoll Ross (1985) model as a control. Our results show that both methods give very similar results. 
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The model involves fitting a smooth discount function to information obtained from 
observed prices of straight bonds with various coupons and maturities by estimating the 
coefficients for a linear combination of smooth approximating functions forming a cubic 
spline. This estimated discount function can then be inverted to obtain the term structure of 
interest rates. It can be used to price bonds, obtain the par yield curve, zero coupon yield 
curve and other related data and is the standard procedure in term structure theory.14 The 
equation we estimate has the form 
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where P is the clean price, AI is the accrued coupon, C is the coupon, n is the total number 
of coupons left, hi is the date to the first coupon, i=1 to number of coupons left to maturity, 
i.e n, and hn is the date of the last cash flow. DV represents dummy variables representing 
the spline knots if time left to maturity of the bond is greater than t(.)*. Taking a large cross 
section of bonds in a market at a point in time with differing market prices, diverse coupons 
and times to maturities and using regression allows the estimation of α, β, γ, γ1 and γ2 using 
ordinary  least squares in (10). The error term in the regression ensures that random effects 
are captured. Repeating this exercise over time generates a time series of α, β, γ, γ1 and γ2. 
 
3.2 Data Set 
                                                 
14 The detail of the methodology is available on request. 
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The market prices of Indian bonds and data for modeling the term structure was 
obtained from the Handbooks published by the International Securities Market Association 
(ISMA), formerly known as the Association of International Bond Dealers (AIBD).  
 
Our data is quarterly and the observation period runs from June 29, 1990, four 
months before the first downgrade, to September 30, 1992, the end of the crisis, a total of 
10 observations for each bond. The quarterly window was chosen, based on the timing of 
the downgrades, as the smallest window wide enough to encompass price variations due to 
anticipated changes in pure credit risk that had not yet been formalized by a downgrade.  
Our sample is the subset of eight Indian bonds with varying amounts and maturities issued 
by public sector and quasi public sector borrowers - 3 in USD, 4 in DEM and 1 in JPY - 
that remained outstanding over the entire observation period. We also considered the Fung 
and Rudd (1986) argument that the time period should be not be too close to the issue date 
of any bond, since these prices often mirror issue costs along with interest-rate driven price 
movements. There were no direct sovereign issues made but all the above issuers were 
under the control, management and ownership of the Government of India and were 
guaranteed by it. Apart from ONGC, they are all financial institutions. The details of 
these bonds are given in Table 1. 
 
(Insert Table 1)  
 
To estimate the riskless term structure in the unregulated, tax-free Eurobond market 
of 1990-1992, we constructed sample sets for each observation date of not less than 50 
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bonds15 issued by officially backed supranationals, for each of the three currencies 
constituting India’s external debt - US dollars, German marks, and Japanese yen.16 We use 
the supranationals to estimate the international riskless term structure rather than the 
corresponding treasuries in order to avoid biases that can creep into national credit markets 
through taxes, regulations, government intervention and the like. The supranationals 
included in our sample are guaranteed at least de facto by their member governments and 
borrow at terms equivalent to, and at times better than, the treasuries of the currencies in 
question. Thus, they are effectively riskless and give the best picture of the international 
riskless term structure of interest rates. The large number of bonds in each sample was 
necessary to ensure the desirable asymptotic qualities of consistency and sufficiency. To 
ensure a balanced sample over the whole term structure, bonds in equal numbers were 
chosen with term left to maturity of less than three years, between three and six years, and 
over six years. 
 
3.3 The Methodology 
We proceed in three steps. 
• We estimate the riskless term structure for each time period, developed from 
McCulloch’s cubic spline methodology, on the cross section of supranational bonds 
in the USD market, the JPY market and the DEM market. This gives us three time 
series for the riskless term structure, one in USD, one in DEM, and one in JPY. 
 
                                                 
15 Most studies like Brown and Dybvig (1986) use the same dataset. However, even when the currency market was the same, in this study, the data set was varied 
to enable the use of very short bonds. This was to prevent the underestimation of the very short end of the yield curve to the extent of the time between June 1990 
and September 1992. The June 1990 observations would have had to otherwise include observations at least 27 months away from maturity. 
16 These issuers include the World Bank, Eurofima, the European Investment Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank etc., 
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In the estimation of the riskless yield curve, we used two spline17 knot points of 
three and six years. The choice of these two points was based on the observation that the 
Eurobond market typically deals in shorter maturities than their respective domestic bond 
markets. Thus, we reasoned that the break points for investor perceptions of uncertainty, 
liquidity and risk in the Eurobond market could reasonably be represented as relatively 
short term: up to three years, relatively medium term: between three and six years, and 
relatively long term: above six years. 
 
Although bond prices are quoted clean in the Eurobond market, i.e. they are quoted 
free from any accrued coupon in order to facilitate yield comparisons, the actual sale is on 
the basis of the dirty price, i.e. the clean price cum accrued interest.18 In order to take this 
into account, dirty prices were computed accordingly on the basis of days the bond was not 
held by the buyer.19 The ask prices were used to compute the dirty prices.20 
 
Using observed values of prices, coupons and times to maturity, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions were run on SHAZAM to estimate the term structure 
parameters, which were then used to compute the discount curve and the spot rate curve. 
                                                 
17A spline is a model which incorporates switching coefficients of regression in two or more periods of time. To make this a smooth transition and to estimate it, it 
is essential that two regression lines meet at a switching point (knot) in a manner that in the example of a cubic spline satisfies the following; 
 
Yt=α1+β1Xt+γ1Xt2+d1Xt3+et       (t=1,2...,t*) 
 
Yt=α2+β2Xt+γ2Xt2+d2Xt3+et       (t=t*+1,t*+2...,n) 
The requirement is that at point t=t* the first and second derivative of these curves be the same. 
18 See equation 10. 
19Unlike more imprecise methods like Chambers et al (1984) who computed interest accrued to the nearest quarter, dirty prices used in this study were precise to 
the day. 
19There were two other choices in this matter : 
1)Bid prices could have been used on the argument that they are prices the market makers are ready to buy at, or  
2)The midpoint of the two,  i.e. the mean of the bid and ask price could have been used. However it was found that the bid-ask spread was very narrow in the 
market. In view of this we found it reasonable to calculate the prices on the basis of ask quotations along with the accrued coupon. 
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The discount curve was computed for twelve years to allow comparability between data 
sets. 
• We then apply the corresponding riskless term structure for each time period to each 
of the Indian Eurobonds in our sample to estimate their “theoretical riskless price”. 
This gives us eight time series, one for each bond, of the theoretical riskless price of 
the Indian Eurobonds in the sample. The theoretical riskless price represents what 
the market price of the bonds would be at each period if they were devoid of pure 
credit risk: their prices would vary only with changes in the conditions of capital 
market equilibrium reflected in the term structure.21 
• Next, we use the “theoretical riskless prices” in the relationship developed in 
equation 9 to measure to what extent variations in the observed prices of the Indian 
bonds are explained by market risk, that is, by variations in the riskless term 
structure reflected in variations in the theoretical bond prices. We test the equation 
ti
t
i
i
t
i
T
dTaa
P
dP ε++= 21             (11) 
where 1a  is a constant, 2a  is the coefficient (which may be time varying) 
corresponding in equation 9 to ii DE , the ratio of the elasticity of the observed 
bond with respect to the short term riskless interest rate and the duration of the 
theoretical bond. The symbol ε  represents the error term.  
 
• Finally, after checking for robustness, we introduce a dummy variable for each 
migration along with the theoretical bond prices to estimate the magnitude and 
significance of pure credit risk. The assumption here is that the quarterly window is 
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wide enough to capture price changes due to anticipated migrations. After 
controlling for robustness, we then use the estimated coefficients to calculate the 
cost of the pure credit risk measured in basis points. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Estimates of the Term Structure 
Five parameters were estimated for the cubic spline regressions. The results, not 
reported here but available on request, of the 30 regression coefficients, i.e., the three 
currency markets over ten time periods, are very good, although not all the parameters 
are always statistically significant.22  The α coefficient is always significant and always 
negative for all three currencies. The results are best for the dollar. The β and γ 
coefficients are usually significant at the 5% level. Otherwise, except in one case, they 
are significant at the 10% level. The curvature coefficients represented by 1γ  and 2γ  
are also often significant at the 5% level and usually significant at the 10% level, more 
so for 1γ  than 2γ , thereby indicating more curvature effect at the short end of the 
structure than the long end. For the yen, the β and γ coefficients are usually significant 
at the 10% level. However, 1γ  and 2γ  are clearly significant together in only three 
periods: June 1990, March 1991, and December 1991. In March 1992 short-term 
curvature is significant and in June 1992 long term curvature is significant. For the 
mark no parameters except α are significant at the beginning of the observation period. 
However, starting in March 1991 β becomes significant at the 5% level and γ at the 
10% level. Except for June 1991, they stay significant until the last period, September 
1992. The curvature coefficients are only sigificant in December 1991 and June 1992. 
                                                                                                                                               
21 We also estimate the yield curve using the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) model, which gives similar results. These results are not reported here but are 
available on request. 
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We used the parameters estimated above to compute the yield curves and discount 
functions and compared the results with those estimated with the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(1985) model.23 They are almost indistinguishable, which is strong evidence for their 
accuracy. The shape of the yield curve showed a consistently upward sloping curve for the 
dollar market. The yen long-term rate fell below the short-term rate from September 1991 
to March 1992, down to almost 0, in the last two mentioned time periods. In two cases it 
was almost the same as the short-term rate i.e. in September 1990 and March 1991. During 
this period i.e. from June 1990 to March 1991, it was only marginally above the short rate. 
During the remaining last period however, the difference widened. The DEM yield curves 
showed either the interest rate at the long end to be roughly of the same magnitude as the 
short, or inverted. During this period, Germany was also undergoing the event of re-
unification and the yield curve was inverted. In summary, the shape of the two ends of the 
yield curves seems satisfactory. 
 
4.2 Indian Bonds, Market Risk and Migration 
 
We then applied the foregoing riskless term structures to each of the Indian 
bonds in our sample for each observation period in order to estimate their theoretical 
prices. In all, 80 observations were collated (10 quarters × 8 bonds) from the thirty yield 
curves (3 currency markets × 10 quarters). When we compare the theoretical price with 
the observed price, we find that there are only four instances out of 80 where the 
theoretical price was below the observed price. This is further evidence that we have 
                                                                                                                                               
22 The results of the Breusch Pagan Test, not reported here, show that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected in most cases at the 10% 
significance level. 
23 Results available on request. 
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accurately captured the riskless term structure. Table 2 shows that for every bond, the 
average theoretical prices were higher than those of the corresponding market prices. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
 
In graphs 1-8 we can see the evolution of the theoretical bond price, the actual bond price 
and the 6-month LIBOR of the corresponding currency. 
 
[insert graphs 1-8] 
 
It is interesting that short-term interest rates were generally decreasing for the dollar 
and the yen while mark rates were mixed. It is also interesting that the discount on the 
actual bond prices with respect to the theoretical price was at first increasing and then 
decreasing over the period. The change in the discount could be due to variations in the risk 
premium. On the other hand, it could also be due to variations in the term structure or some 
combination of the two. Since there is no risk premium associated with the theoretical price 
because it is estimated with the riskless term structure, the theoretical price will vary only 
with respect to the particular bond characteristics or variations in the term structure. To see 
to what extent the discount is due to the structure of the yield curve and the particular 
bond characteristics, we test the actual prices with respect to the theoretical prices (8 bonds 
x 10 time periods) proposed in equation 9. 
 
 First we test for stationarity in the panel data series tPdP /  and tTdT /  using the 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1995) T-bar test as applied in Wu and Chen (1999). The Z scores 
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are –18.76 and –14.33 respectively. The corresponding 95% critical values are 
09177.3±  generated by the Monte Carlo simulations.24 Thus we reject non-stationarity. 
 
We use equation 11, ε++= tt TdTaaPdP 21 , to test the relationship developed 
in equation 9. To overcome the problems of heteroskedasticity and cross sectional 
correlation arising from the data pooled over 8 bonds and 10 time periods, we used the 
Kmenta (1990) full cross-sectionally correlated and time-wise autogressive model.25 
We expect 1a  to be equal to zero and 2a  to be positive.26 The results are reported in table 3. 
They show that 1a  is very small and not statistically different from zero with a p-value of 
0.3.27 On the other hand, 2a  is highly significant with a p-value of 0.00 and, as expected, it 
is positive.28 Furthermore, the overall equation is very good with an 2R  of over 99% and no 
evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals. This suggests that the variation in the 
international risk-free term structure of interest rates explains almost all of the price 
variations in the Eurobonds. There is, however, the possibility that the ii DE , reflected in 
2a , may vary over the time period under consideration. Given that we expect the actual and 
theoretical bond prices to be non-stationary but co-integrated, as indicated in figures 1-8, 
by regressing first differences upon each other without the error correction term, the point 
estimates potentially suffer bias. More specifically, if we use equation 9 with a potentially 
time varying coefficient, the estimates for 2a  may suffer from omitted variable bias. To test 
for this we re-estimate equation 11 and include the error correction term. The results 
suggest that there is nothing to be gained by including this term. The coefficient 1a  remains 
                                                 
24 Details of the simulations are available on request. 
25 We found that the Kmenta model worked best with no correction for autocorrelation. 
26 See equations 7 and 8. 
27 Tests for bond specific fixed effects were also negative at conventional levels of significance 
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small and insignificant, 2a  is of the same order of magnitude (0.71 as opposed to 0.77) and 
significance (p = 0.00) as when the error correction term is omitted but the adjusted 2R  falls 
to 0.55. Thus, we conclude that our results in table 3 do not suffer from the absence of the 
error correction term. 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
To account for the effect of migration, we add three dummy variables, one for each 
downgrade, with the value of 1 for the quarter that the downgrade occurred and zeros 
everywhere else and test the equation29 
 
ttt DbDbDbTdTaaPdP ε+++++= 321 32143              (12) 
 
where D1, D2, and D3 represent the dummy variables for the first, second and third 
downgrades respectively. With the inclusion of the dummy variables, we have no 
expectations about 3a , which will capture any constant effects associated with pure credit 
risk. We expect that 4a  will be similar to 2a  and that 1b , 2b , and 3b  will be small and 
negative. 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
28 Tests for bond specific slope effects confirm that the slopes for the individual bonds are all positive at conventional levels of significance.  
29 Though the downgrades were only for rated bonds we used the downgrade to apply to all Indian bonds, including those that were non-rated. Later we tested 
through a regression whether there was any difference between the rated and non rated bonds and found no significant difference. The regression was 
ε++++++= 4321 3432143 DbDbDbDbTdTaaPdP  
where D34 was the dummy for non rated issuer. The coefficent b34 insignificant for D34. Full regression results are available on request. 
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 Table 4 shows the results. As expected, 4a  is similar to 2a , changing by only 
0.01872 with an undiminished p-value and suggests that a 1% change in the price of the 
theoretical bond causes about a 0.79% change in the price of the Eurobond. All three 
dummy variable coefficients are small and have the right sign but only the first and third 
downgrades are significant. The explanation for this is probably that the second downgrade 
was anticipated when the first downgrade occurred. The lower adjusted 2R  of 0.9831 
reflects the inclusion of the insignificant dummy variable. 
 
 We ultimately intend to use the migration coefficients to estimate the cost of 
migration for the individual bonds in the sample. The coefficients in Table 4 are averages 
for all the bonds but the migration effect will very possibly be influenced by other factors 
that differ across bonds, such as currency of issue, the maturity of the issue and 
characteristics specific to individual bonds such as coupon rate, payout schedules, 
embedded options and the like. To get a more nuanced estimate of the cost of migration, we 
test for each of these effects. 
 
 First, we check for special effects associated with the individual currencies. 
Variables D4, D5, and D6 take the value of 1 for downgrades 1, 2, and 3 respectively for 
the USD and zeros everywhere else. Variables D7, D8, and D9 are the same but refer to the 
DEM. We test the equation 
 
t
i
itt DibDbDbDbTdTaaPdP ε∑
=
++++++=
9
4
32143 321           (13) 
From the results given in Table 5 we see that none of the new dummies are significant and 
conclude that there is no currency effect. 
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(Insert Table 5) 
 
 Next, we check for a maturity effect by adding dummies D10, D11, and D12 that 
take the value of 1 for migrations 1, 2, and 3 respectively for bonds with maturities greater 
than 3 years and zeros everywhere else. We test the equation 
 
t
i
itt DibDbDbDbTdTaaPdP ε∑
=
++++++=
12
10
32143 321             (14) 
 
 
From the results given in Table 6 we see that the coefficients for dummies 10 and 
12 are not significant. The coefficient for dummy 11 is significant but is associated with 
downgrade 2, which is not significant. We conclude that there is no maturity effect. 
 
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
 
 Finally, we check whether there are any other special effects associated with the 
individual bonds. Dummy variables D13 to D19 take the value of 1 for the first 
downgrade for bonds 1 through 7 and zero everywhere else. Dummy variables D20 to 
D26 take the value of 1 for the second downgrade for bonds 1 through 7 and zero 
everywhere else. Dummy variables D27 to D33 take the value of 1 for the third 
downgrade for bonds 1 through 7 and zero everywhere else. We test the equations 
 
t
i
itt DibDbTdTaaPdP ε∑
=
++++=
19
13
143 1                                    (15) 
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t
i
it DibDbTdTaaPdP ε∑
=
++++=
26
20
243 2                                    (16) 
t
i
itt DibDbTdTaaPdP ε∑
=
++++=
33
27
343 3                                    (17) 
 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 7 give the results for equations 15, 16, and 17 
respectively.  None of the coefficients for the new dummy variables is significant.  
Therefore, we conclude that there are no individual bond effects. 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
 Overall, we conclude that the coefficients for rating changes estimated in 
equation 12 accurately measure the effect of migration on Indian bond prices over the 
sample period. The first downgrade was highly significant and caused a fall of a little 
more than 3% in the price of the bonds. The second downgrade, which occurred in the 
period immediately following the first downgrade, was not significant, probably 
because its effects were anticipated in the coefficient of the first downgrade. 
Anticipation of the second downgrade would explain why the coefficient of the first 
downgrade is almost three times higher than the coefficient of the third downgrade, 
which is also highly significant, causing a fall of a little more than 1% in the price of the 
bonds. When we control for other factors that might influence the effect of migration on 
the bond prices, i.e. currency of issue, maturity and other factors specific to individual 
bonds, none are significant.  
 
The implication is that there are no currency, maturity or bond specific effects 
associated with migration. While this outcome might be considered somewhat 
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counterintuitive, the explanation can probably be found in the de facto nature of sovereign 
debt. Contrary to the corporate sector, outright sovereign defaults or repudiations are rare 
because there is no scope for asset recovery. Restructuring and renegotiation is more 
common. In fact, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) report that the same bond may be renegotiated 
repeatedly. Consequently, contractual cash flow maturities are negotiable with a random 
element, thereby making it difficult to discriminate between shorter and longer-term 
maturities. Furthermore, the sovereign “willingness to pay” factor is insensitive to maturity, 
currency and individual bond covenants and thereby reduces distinctions across bonds. 
 
The effect of migration on the individual bonds can be estimated in terms of 
yield to maturity. To make this estimation, we multiply the value of each bond in the 
period preceding downgrades 1 and 3 by coefficients 1b  and 3b  respectively.30 The result 
gives the change in the price of the bonds due to migration. We then subtract this amount 
from the price of the bond in the period preceding the downgrade and recalculate the yield 
to maturity using this new price. The difference between the yields in maturity is the 
estimate of the cost of migration in terms of basis points. The results of this exercise are 
presented in Table 8.  
 
(Insert Table 8) 
 
 
On average, the first migration cost about 106 basis points (bp) and the third about 
42 bp. However, for both downgrades the cost in yields varies from bond to bond. In fact, 
                                                 
30 The second downgrade was not significant and therefore is not included in the estimation.  
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because of the common migration effect, the cost is higher the shorter the maturity.31 This is 
true both within and across currencies and regardless of the coupon rate. The longer dollar 
and mark maturities have higher costs. The 5.25% yen issue, which matures in 21/06/93, 
has a cost 10 bp higher than the 9.75% dollar issue maturing five months later. The 7% 
mark bond maturing four months before the 5.25% yen issue carries a cost of 23 bp above 
the yen issue. This outcome suggests that bonds with shorter maturities are relatively more 
exposed to migration risk than those of longer maturities. 
 
 
6.Conclusions 
 
In this paper we propose a methodology for measuring to what extent India’s 
financial difficulties were the result of conditions prevailing on the international capital 
markets at the time, reflected in changes in the risk free international term structure of 
interest rates, and to what extent they were linked to credit risk specific to the country’s 
political environment and its economic and financial management as reflected in the 
three ranking migrations. We find that most of the changes in Indian Eurobond prices 
over the period were due to conditions on the international capital markets. A 1% 
change in the price of the theoretical bond caused about a 0.79% change in the price of 
the Indian Eurobonds. The effect of credit risk specific to the country’s political 
environment and its economic and financial management were relatively small. 
Averaging over all bonds, the first migration added about 106 basis points on to the 
bonds’ yields to maturity while the third migration added about 42. The second 
migration was very small and not statistically significant, indicating that it was 
anticipated by the markets and priced in the first downgrade.  
                                                 
31 This stands in contrast to the results of Elton et al. (2001), which suggest that this result does not apply 
to their selection of corporate bonds  
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Our results are significant and robust. We find that the effect of migration on 
bond prices is not affected by currency, maturity or bond specific factors. Interestingly, 
however, shorter maturities are more sensitive to migration risk in that downward 
migration increases yields to maturity for shorter maturities more than for longer 
maturities.  
 29  
Graphs 1-8 
Relationship Between Theoretical Prices, Actual Prices and LIBOR of 
Selected Indian Bonds 
Note: Arrows on horizontal time axis indicate downgradings on 4th October 1990, 26th 
March 1991 and 24th June 1991. 
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Appendix 1. Major Reforms And Liberalisation Measures Since 1991 
Financial • Banking system shedding its socio-political links and conducting its 
activities more on the lines of viability and profitability.  
• Misdirected investments and bad debts identified earlier and the 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (the compulsory purchase of Government 
securities by the banking sector) reduced. 
• Credit on concessional terms to a multitude of priority areas laid down 
dismantled and the administered interest rate regime should be replaced 
by more market-determined rates.  
• The financial sector building up its health by putting prudential capital-
adequacy norms, increased provision for non-performing assets and 
stricter income and asset classification, leading to the ultimate adoption 
of accounting norms and practices in line with the international 
community.  
• Greater financial autonomy to banks and other financial enterprises, 
promoting competition amongst them and rapid induction of a work 
culture based on automation and computerization.  
Industrial • Delicensing paving the way for easy entry to industries, which were 
hitherto regulated.  
• The Office of the Controller for Capital Issues, which used to formerly 
grant permission for the floating of an issue in the market, was 
abolished in May 1992.  
• The Monopolies and Trade Practices Act, which regulated the growth 
of the size of industry, has been changed drastically, to allow automatic 
clearance to companies expanding existing units or setting up new 
units.  
•  Locational policies have been liberalized. 
• The role of the stock market has been strengthened by the introduction 
of several supervisory bodies overseen by Stock Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI) and an over the counter market is in operation. A National 
Stock Exchange of India, connecting all the major exchanges 
electronically is now in operation.  
• The Convertibility clause, which allowed a financial institution which 
had lent debt to an enterprise, convert its loans into equity and thus 
assume voting power has been repealed. 
Public 
sector 
• Privatizatisation by the reduction in the list of industries reserved for 
the public sector and the divestment of shares, 
• The policy of treating sick public sector units in line with such private 
sector units 
• Allowing managers greater autonomy. 
• Introduction of selective competition in the reserved area 
Fiscal 
Policy 
• Lower rates of taxation 
• Narrower spread between the entry rate and the maximum marginal rate
• Fewer exemptions and deductions. 
• The indirect taxation system was also to be cut  
• Simplification in areas of capital, corporate, wealth, income and 
indirect taxes. 
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 Table 1. BONDS ISSUED IN THE EUROMARKET BY INDIA (1980-92) 
NAME DATE OF 
ISSUE 
CURRENCY AMOUNT MATURITY COUPON 
Industrial 
Development 
Bank of India  
6/1989 dollar 100 million 6/6/1996 10% 
 
Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Commission 
12/1988 dollar 125 million 16/11/1993 9.75% 
 
Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Commission 
3/1990 dollar 125 million 16/03/1997 10% 
 
 
State Bank of 
India 
6/1988 yen 15 billion 21/06/1993 5.25% 
Industrial 
Development 
Bank of India 
3/1987 DM 200 million 21/12/1994 6.375% 
 
Industrial 
Development 
Bank of India 
9/1988 DM 250 million 1/9/1995 6.625% 
 
Industrial 
Development 
Bank of India 
2/1986 DM 100 million 
 
1/2/1993 7% 
Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Commission 
2/1987 DM 150 million 25/02/1994 6.375% 
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Table 2 AVERAGE THEORETICAL AND OBSERVED PRICES 
 
Bond 
Mean theoretical 
price 
Mean observed 
price 
IDBI,10%,$, 6/96 112.5944 103.8519 
ONGC,9.75%,$, 11/93 110.4357 106.1006 
ONGC, 10%,$, 3/97 113.4141 101.2814 
SBI, 5.25%, Y, 6/93 99.24192 97.21224 
IDBI, 6.375%, DM, 
12/94 
96.06871 92.68858 
IDBI, 6.625%, DM, 9/95 96.40324 91.50577 
IDBI, 7%, DM, 2/93 100.2424 98.81608 
ONGC,6.375%, DM, 
2/94 
96.97537 93.20704 
Average For All Bonds 103.17198 98.08295 
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Table 3 REGRESSION RESULTS USING CHANGE IN THEORETICAL PRICES 
 
1. ε++= TdTaaPdP 21  
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9931, , BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9932 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.9101 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = -0.25509 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = -0.19255 
 
Variables  
 
T ratio P value 
a1 = 0.0018837 1.045 0.300 
a2 = 0.77426 100.7 0.000 
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Table 4 REGRESSION RESULTS USING CHANGE IN THEORETICAL PRICES AND 
RATING CHANGES 
 
2. ε+++++= 321 32143 DbDbDbTdTaaPdP  
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9831 , BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9834 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.9082 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = -0.80024 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = -0.64214 
 
Variables 
 
T ratio P value 
a3 = 0.0060580 4.429 0.000 
a4 = 0.79298 62.2 0.000 
b1 =  -0.031244 -8.455  0.000 
b2 =  -0.0021178 -0.5759  0.567 
b3 =  -0.010812 -3.22  0.02 
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Table 5 REGRESSION RESULTS USING CHANGE IN THEORETICAL PRICES,  
RATING CHANGES AND CURRENCY EFFECTS 
 
3. ε∑
=
++++++=
9
4
32143 321
i
i DibDbDbDbTdTaaPdP   
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9796. , BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE =  0.9805 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.8130 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = 0.14199 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = 0.48982 
 
 
Variables   
 
T ratio P value 
a3 =  0.0033839 3.084      0.003 
a4 =  0.75248      39.84 0.000 
b1 =  -0.025425 -5.002      0.000 
b2 =  0.0052218 1.020 0.312 
b3 =  0.0082257 3.596 0.001 
 b4 =  0.0045697 0.4237 0.673 
b5 =  -0.019094 -1.777      0.081 
b6 =  -0.014152 -1.289      0.202 
b7 =  -0.0022683 -0.1708      0.865 
b8 =  -0.021425 -1.592      0.117 
b9 =  -0.0079308 -0.8948      0.374 
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Table 6  REGRESSION RESULTS USING CHANGE IN THEORETICAL PRICES,  
RATING CHANGES AND MATURITY 
 
4. ε∑
=
++++++=
12
10
32143 321
i
i DibDbDbDbTdTaaPdP  
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9547, BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9560 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.8910 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = -2.1413 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = -1.8884 
 
 
Variables   
 
T ratio P value 
a3 =  0.0051729 2.98        0.004 
a4 =  0.78350      28.13 0.000 
b1 =  -0.021736 -4.244 0.000 
b2 =  -0.0088241 -1.710 0.092 
b3 =  -0.0030840 -0.7155 0.477 
b10 =  0.010702 0.8575 0.394 
b11 =  0.016532 2.341 0.022 
b12 =  -0.0084545 -1.463 0.148 
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Table 7 REGRESSION RESULTS USING CHANGE IN THEORETICAL PRICES, 
RATING CHANGES AND INDIVIDUAL BOND EFFECTS 
Panel A 
5. ε∑
=
++++=
19
13
143 1
i
i DibDbTdTaaPdP  
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9964, BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9964 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.9101 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = 0.22729 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = 0.54349 
 
 
Variables  
 
T ratio P value 
a3 =  0.0036248 2.772 0.007 
a4 =  0.78780      112.4 0.000 
b1 =  -0.038850 -1.055 0.295 
b13 =  0.023371 1.082 0.283 
b14 =  -0.0012702 -0.03798 0.970 
b15 =  0.018595 0.3582 0.721 
b16 =  0.012267 0.4444 0.658 
b17 =  0.019992 1.027 0.309 
b18 =  -0.037093 -1.03 0.307 
                b19 =  0.029884 0.9681 0.337 
Panel B 
6. ε∑
=
++++=
26
20
243 2
i
i DibDbTdTaaPdP  
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9972,  BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9972 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.7502 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = 0.26501 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = 0.58121 
 
 
Variables  
 
T ratio P value 
a3 = -0.0014354 -2.260 0.027 
a4 = 0.71615      110.1 0.000 
b2 = -0.0027812 -0.07375 0.941 
b20 = 0.022421 0.9832 0.329 
b21 = -0.033193 -1.104 0.274 
b22 = -0.030767 -0.5834 0.562 
b23 = 0.019249 0.7392 0.463 
b24 = -0.0013943 -0.07317 0.942 
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 b25 = 0.058545 1.615 0.111 
 b26 =-0.020150 -0.6208 0.537 
Panel C 
7. ε∑
=
++++=
33
27
343 3
i
i DibDbTdTaaPdP  
BUSE [1973] R-SQUARE = 0.9917, BUSE RAW MOMENT R-SQUARE =  0.9917 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.9225 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = 0.16670 
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = 0.48290 
 
 
Variables 
 
T ratio P value 
a3 = 0.0040730 2.801 0.007 
a4 = 0.73377   84.92 0.000 
b3 = -0.027916 -0.7884 0.433 
b27 = -0.024031 -1.128 0.264 
b28 = 0.024668 0.8238 0.413 
b29 = 0.0021432 0.04189 0.967 
b30 = 0.015128 0.5949 0.554 
b31 = 0.017888 1.022 0.311 
b32 = 0.018303 0.4724 0.638 
b33 = 0.034585 1.1777 0.244 
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Table 8 IMPACT OF COST OF MIGRATION ON YIELDS TO MATURITY 
Bond Date Maturity price after downgrade yld before yld after diff in yld
  IDBI,10%,$, 6/89 Sept 30-1990 06/06/96 100.125 96.9967 0.0995 0.1071 0.0076 
  ONGC, 9.75%,$, 12/88 Sept 30-1990 16/11/93 100.25 97.1178 0.0963 0.1086 0.0123 
  ONGC, 10%,$, 3/90 Sept 30-1990 16/03/97 99.875 96.7545 0.1000 0.1069 0.0069 
  SBI, 5.25%, Y, 6/88 Sept 30-1990 21/06/93 91.125 88.2779 0.0904 0.1038 0.0133 
  IDBI, 6.375%, DM, 3/87 Sept 30-1990 21/12/94 88.625 85.8560 0.0977 0.1069 0.0092 
  IDBI, 6.625%, DM, 9/88 Sept 30-1990 01/09/95 88.75 85.9771 0.0959 0.1040 0.0081 
  IDBI, 7%, DM, 2/86 Sept 30-1990 01/02/93 94 91.0631 0.0996 0.1153 0.0156 
  ONGC,6.375%, DM, 2/87 Sept 30-1990 25/02/94 91 88.1568 0.0981 0.1100 0.0119 
  IDBI,10%,$, 6/89 Mar 31-1991 06/06/96 102 100.8972 0.0948 0.0975 0.0028 
  ONGC, 9.75%,$, 12/88 Mar 31-1991 16/11/93 97.875 96.8168 0.1067 0.1116 0.0049 
  ONGC, 10%,$, 3/90 Mar 31-1991 16/03/97 99 97.9296 0.1023 0.1048 0.0025 
  SBI, 5.25%, Y, 6/88 Mar 31-1991 21/06/93 93.75 92.7364 0.0842 0.0897 0.0055 
  IDBI, 6.375%, DM, 3/87 Mar 31-1991 21/12/94 89.125 88.1614 0.0999 0.1034 0.0035 
  IDBI, 6.625%, DM, 9/88 Mar 31-1991 01/09/95 87.75 86.8012 0.1018 0.1048 0.0030 
  IDBI, 7%, DM, 2/86 Mar 31-1991 01/02/93 93.125 92.1181 0.1131 0.1199 0.0068 
  ONGC,6.375%, DM, 2/87 Mar 31-1991 25/02/94 90 89.0269 0.1053 0.1097 0.0044 
 
 
